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Abstract. Universities and other educational organizations are adopting com-
puter-based assessment tools (herein called e-exams) to reach larger and ubiqui-
tous audiences. While this makes examination tests more accessible, it exposes
them to unprecedented threats not only from candidates but also from authori-
ties, which organize exams and deliver marks. Thus, e-exams must be checked
to detect potential irregularities. In this paper, we propose several monitors, ex-
pressed as Quantified Event Automata (QEA), to monitor the main properties of
e-exams. Then, we implement the monitors using MarQ, a recent Java tool de-
signed to support QEAs. Finally, we apply our monitors to logged data from real
e-exams conducted by Universite´ Joseph Fourier at pharmacy faculty, as a part of
Epreuves Classantes Nationales informatise´es, a pioneering project which aims
to realize all french medicine exams electronically by 2016. Our monitors found
discrepancies between the specification and the implementation.
1 Introduction
Electronic exams, also known as e-exams, are computer-based systems employed to
assess the skills, or the knowledge of candidates. Running e-exams promises to be eas-
ier than running traditional pencil-and-paper exams, and cheaper on the long term. E-
exams are deployed easily, and they are flexible in where and when exams can be set;
their test sessions are open to a very large public of candidates and, if the implementa-
tion allows automatic marking, their results are immediately available.
We do not want to argue about the actual benefits of e-exams in promoting and
supporting education, but as a matter of facts, their use has considerably raised (and
will likely continue to raise). Nowadays, several universities, such as MIT, Stanford,
and Berkeley, just to cite a few, have began to offer university courses remotely using
the Massive Open Online Course platforms (e.g., Coursera4 and edX5) which offer e-
exams. Even in a less ambitious and more traditional setting, universities start adopting
e-exams to replace traditional exams, especially in the case of multiple-choice questions
and short open answers. For example, pharmacy exams at Universite´ Joseph Fourier
(UJF) have been organized electronically using tablet computers since 2014 [1]. Since
several french medicine exams are multiple-choice tests, the French government plans
to realize all medicine exams electronically by 2016.6 Other institutions, such as ETS7,
CISCO8, and Microsoft9, have for long already adopted their own platforms to run, gen-
erally in qualified centers, electronic tests required to obtain their program certificates.
4 www.coursera.org 5 www.edx.org 6 The project is called E´preuves Clas-
santes Nationales informatise´es, see www.side-sante.org 7 www.etsglobal.org
8 www.cisco.com 9 www.microsoft.com/learning/en-us/default.aspx
This migration towards information technology is changing considerably the pro-
ceeding of exams, but the approach in coping with their security still focuses only on
preventing candidates from cheating with invigilated tests. Wherever it is not possi-
ble to have human invigilators, a software running on the student computer is used,
e.g., ProctorU10. However, such measures are insufficient, as the trustworthiness and
the reliability of exams are today threatened not only by candidates. Indeed, threats and
errors may come from the use of information technology, as well as, from bribed exam-
iners and dishonest exam authorities which are willing to tamper with exams as recent
scandals have shown. For example, in the Atlanta scandal, school authorities colluded
in changing student marks to improve their institution’s rankings and get more public
funds [2]. The BBC revealed another scandal where ETS was shown to be vulnerable
to a fraud perpetrated by official invigilators in collusion with the candidates who were
there to get their visas: the invigilators dictated the correct answers during the test [3].
To address these problems, e-exams must be checked for the presence/absence of
irregularities and provide evidence about the fairness and the correctness of their grad-
ing procedures. Assumptions on the honesty of authorities are not justifiable anymore.
Verification should be welcomed by authorities since verifying e-exams provides trans-
parency and then public trust. E-exams offer the possibility to have extensive data logs,
which can provide grounds for the verification and checking process, however, the re-
quirements to be satisfied by e-exams have to be clearly defined and formalized before.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, this paper proposes the first formaliza-
tion of e-exams properties, using Quantified Event Automata (QEAs) [4, 5], and their
off-line runtime verification on actual logs. Our contributions are as follows. First, we
define an event-based model of e-exams that is suitable for monitoring purposes. More-
over, we formalize eight fundamental properties as QEAs: no unregistered candidate
try to participate in the exam by submitting an answer; answers are accepted only from
registered candidates; all accepted answers are submitted by candidates, and for each
question at most one answer is accepted per candidate; all candidates answer the ques-
tions in the required order; answers are accepted only during the examination time;
another variant of the latter that offers flexibility in the beginning and the duration of
the exam; all answers are marked correctly; and the correct mark is assigned to each
candidate. Our formalization also allows us for some properties to detect the cause of
the potential failures and the party responsible for them. Note, formalizing the above
properties entailed to add features to QEAs. Then, we implement the monitors using
MarQ11 [6], a Java tool designed to support QEA specification language. Finally, we
perform off-line monitoring, based on the available data logs, for an e-exam organized
by UJF; and reveal both students that violate the requirements, and discrepancies be-
tween the specification and the implementation.
Outline. In Sec. 2, we define the events and a protocol for e-exams. We specify the
properties and propose the corresponding monitors in Sec. 3. Then, in Sec. 4, we ana-
lyze two actual e-exams organized by UJF. We discuss related work in Sec. 5. Finally,
we conclude in Sec. 6. An extended version of this paper is available as [7].
10 www.proctoru.com 11 www.github.com/selig/qea
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2 An Event-based Model of E-exams
We define an e-exam execution (or e-exam run) by a finite sequence of events, called
trace. Such event-based modelling of e-exam runs is appropriate for monitoring actual
events of the system. In this section, we specify the parties and the phases involved in
e-exams. Then, we define the events related to an e-exam run. Note, the e-exam model
introduced in this section refines the one proposed in [8].
2.1 Overview of an E-exam Protocol
An exam involves at least two roles: the candidate and the exam authority. An exam au-
thority can have several sub-roles: the registrar registers candidates; the question com-
mittee prepares the questions; the invigilator supervises the exam, collects the answers,
and dispatches them for marking; the examiner corrects the answers and marks them;
the notification committee delivers the marking. Generally, exams run in four phases:
1) Registration, when the exam is set up and candidates enrol; 2) Examination, when
candidates answer the questions, submit them to the authority, and have them officially
accepted; 3) Marking, when the answers are marked; 4) Notification, when the grades
are notified to the candidates. Usually, each phase ends before the next one begins.
2.2 Events Involved in an E-exam
Events flag important steps in the execution of the exam. We consider parametric events
of the form e(p1 , . . . , pn), where e is the event name, and p1 , . . . , pn is the list of
symbolic parameters that take some data values at runtime. We define the following
events that are assumed to be recorded during the exam or built from data logs.
– Event register(i) is emitted when candidate i registers to the exam.
– Event get(i , q) is emitted when candidate i gets question q .
– Event change(i , q , a) is emitted when candidate i changes on his computer the
answer field of question q to a .
– Event submit(i , q , a) is emitted when candidate i submits answer a to question q .
– Event accept(i , q , a) is emitted when the exam authority receives and accepts an-
swer a to question q from candidate i .
– Event corrAns(q , a) is emitted when the authority specifies a as a correct answer
to question q . Note that more than one answer can be correct for a given question.
– Event marked(i , q , a, b) is emitted when the answer a from candidate i to ques-
tion q is scored with b. In our properties we assume that the score b ranges over
{0, 1} (1 for correct answer and 0 for wrong answer), however other scores can be
considered.
– Event assign(i ,m) is emitted when mark m is assigned to candidate i . We assume
that the mark of a candidate is the sum of all the scores assigned to his answers.
However, more complex functions can be considered (e.g., weighted scores).
– Event begin(i) is emitted when candidate i begins the examination phase.
– Event end(i) is emitted when candidate i ends the examination phase. The candi-
date terminates the exam himself, e.g., after answering all questions before the end
of the exam duration.
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In general, all events are time stamped, however we parameterize them with time only
when it is relevant for the considered property. Moreover, we may omit some parameters
from the events when they are not relevant to the property. For instance, we may use
submit(i) when candidate i submits an answer regardless of his answer. We also use
marked(q , a, b) instead of marked(i , q , a, b) to capture anonymous marking.
3 Properties of E-exams
In this section, we define eight properties that aim at ensuring e-exams correctness. They
mainly ensure that only registered candidates can take the exam, all accepted answers
are submitted by the candidates, all answers are accepted during the exam duration,
and all marks are correctly computed and assigned to the corresponding candidates.
Note that in case of failure, two of the properties report all the individuals that violate
the requirement of the property. This notion of reporting can be applied to all other
properties (see [7]).
Each property represents a different e-exam requirement and can be monitored in-
dependently. An exam run may satisfy one property and fail on another one, which
narrows the possible source of potential failures and allows us to deliver a detailed re-
port about the satisfied and unsatisfied properties.
Quantified Event Automata (QEAs). We express properties as QEAs [4,5]. We present
QEAs at an abstract level using intuitive terminology and refer to [4] for a formal
presentation. A QEA consists of a list of quantified variables together with an event
automaton. An event automaton is a finite-state machine with transitions labeled by
parametric events, where parameters are instantiated with data-values at runtime. Tran-
sitions may also include guards and assignments to variables. Note, not all variables
need to be quantified. Unquantified variables are left free, and they can be manipulated
through assignments and updated during the processing of the trace. Moreover, new free
variables can be introduced while processing the trace. We extend the initial definition
of QEAs in [4] by i) allowing variable declaration and initialization before reading the
trace, and ii) introducing the notion of global variable shared among all event automaton
instances. Note, we use global variables in our case study presented in Sec. 4.2 and in
the extended version of this paper. Global variables are mainly needed in QEAs to keep
track and report data at the end of monitoring. Such QEAs may also require some ma-
nipulation of the quantified variables which is not currently supported by MarQ. Thus,
we could not implement them and hence omitted them from the paper. The shaded states
are final (accepting) states, while white states are failure states. Square states are closed
to failure, i.e., if no transition can be taken, then there is a transition to an implicit fail-
ure state. Circular states are closed to self (skip) states, i.e., if no transition can be taken,
then there is an implicit self-looping transition. We use the notation [guard]assignment to write
guards and assignments on transitions: :=ˆ for variable declaration then assignment, :=
for assignment, and = for equality test. A QEA formally defines a language (i.e., a set
of traces) over instantiated parametric events.
Correct Exam run. An exam run satisfies a property if the resulting trace is accepted
by the corresponding QEA. A correct exam run satisfies all the properties. We assume
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that an input trace contains events related to a single exam run. To reason about traces
with events from more than one exam run, the events have to be parameterized with an
exam run identifier, which has to be added to the list of quantified variables.
Candidate Registration. The first property is Candidate Registration, which states
that only already registered candidates can submit answers to the exam. An exam run
satisfies Candidate Registration if, for every candidate i , event submit(i) is preceded
by event register(i). A violation of Candidate Registration does not reveal a weakness
in the exam system (as long as the answers submitted from unregistered candidates are
not accepted by the authority). However, it allows us to detect if a candidate tries to fake
the system, which is helpful to be aware of spoofing attacks.
Definition 1 (Candidate Registration). Property Candidate Registration is defined by
the QEA depicted in Fig. 1 with alphabet ΣCR = {register(i), submit(i)}.
∀i
1 2
register(i)
Fig. 1: QEA for Candidate Registration
Initially: I : =ˆ ∅
1 2
register(i) I :=I∪{i}
accept(i , q , a) [i /∈I ]F :=ˆ{(i,q,a)}
register(i) I :=I∪{i}
accept(i , q , a) [i /∈I ]F :=F∪{(i,q,a)}
Fig. 2: QEA for Candidate Eligibility
The input alphabetΣCR for Candidate Registration contains only the events register(i)
and submit(i), so any other event in the trace is ignored. The QEA for Candidate Reg-
istration has two accepting states, and one quantified variable i . Note, the empty trace
is accepted by the QEA. State (1) is a square state, so an event submit(i) that is not pre-
ceded by event register(i) leads to a failure. An event register(i) in state (1) leads to
state (2) which is a skipping (circular) state, so after event register(i) any sequence of
events is accepted. The quantification ∀i means that the property must hold for all val-
ues that i takes in the trace, i.e., the values obtained when matching the symbolic events
in the specification with concrete events in the trace. For instance, let us consider the
following trace: register(i1 ).submit(i2 ).submit(i1 ).register(i2 ). To decide whether
it is accepted or not, the trace is sliced based on the values that can match i , resulting in
the two slices: i 7→ i1 : register(i1 ).submit(i1 ), and i 7→ i2 : submit(i2 ).register(i2 ).
Then, each slice is checked against the event automata instantiated with the appropriate
values for i . The slice associated to i1 is accepted as it reaches the final state (2), while
the slice associated to i2 does not reach a final state since event submit(i2 ) leads from
state (1) to an implicit failure state. Therefore, the whole trace is not accepted by the
QEA. Note, we omit parameters q and a from event submit(i , q , a) since only the fact
that a candidate i submits an answer is significant for the property, regardless of the
question he is answering, and the answer he submitted.
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Candidate Eligibility. Property Candidate Eligibility states that no answer is accepted
from an unregistered candidate. Candidate Eligibility can be modeled by a QEA similar
to that of Candidate Registration depicted in Fig. 1, except that event submit(i , q , a)
has to be replaced by accept(i , q , a) in the related alphabet. However, we formalize
Candidate Eligibility in a way that, in addition to checking the main requirement, it
reports all the candidates that violate the requirement, i.e., those that are unregistered but
some answers are accepted from them. Note, Candidate Registration can also modeled
similarly by replacing accept(i , q , a) with submit(i , q , a).
Definition 2 (Candidate Eligibility). Property Candidate Eligibility is defined by the
QEA depicted in Fig. 2 with alphabet ΣCE = {register(i), accept(i , q , a)}.
The QEA of Candidate Eligibility has three free variables I ,F , and i , and no quan-
tified variables. Instead of being instantiated for each candidate i , the QEA of Can-
didate Eligibility collects all the registered candidates in set I , so that any occurrence
of event accept(i , q , a) at state (1) with i /∈ I fires a transition to the failure state (2).
Such a transition results in the failure of the property since all transitions from state
(2) are self-looping transitions. Set F is used to collect all the unregistered candi-
dates that submitted an answer. Note, variable I is pre-declared and initialized to ∅.
Trace register(i1 ).accept(i2 , q0 , a2 ).accept(i1 , q0 , a1 ).register(i2 ) is not accepted
by Candidate Eligibility, and results in F = {(i2 , q0 , a2 )}. Note, reporting the can-
didates that violates the requirements requires to monitor until the end of the trace.
Answer Authentication. Property Answer Authentication states that all accepted an-
swers are submitted by candidates. Moreover, for every question, exactly one answer is
accepted from each candidate that submitted at least one answer to that question.
Definition 3 (Answer Authentication). Property Answer Authentication is defined by
the QEA depicted in Fig. 3 with alphabet ΣAA = {submit(i , q , a), accept(i , q , a)}.
The QEA of Answer Authentication fails if an unsubmitted answer is accepted. A candi-
date can submit more than one answer to the same question, but exactly one answer has
to be accepted. Note, any answer among the submitted answers can be accepted. How-
ever, the QEA can be updated to allow only the acceptance of the last submitted answers
by replacing set A with a variable, which acts as a placeholder for the last submitted
answer. If no answer is accepted after at least one answer has been submitted, the QEA
ends in the failure state (2), while acceptance of an answer leads to the accepting state
(3). A candidate can submit after having accepted an answer from him to that question.
However, if more than one answer is accepted, an implicit transition from state (3) to a
failure state is fired. Trace submit(i1 , q0 , a1 ).submit(i1 , q0 , a2 ).accept(i1 , q0 , a2 ) –
where candidate i1 submits two answers a1 and a2 to question q0 , then only a2 is ac-
cepted – is accepted by Answer Authentication. While the traces accept(i1 , q , a), where
an unsubmitted answer is accepted from i1 , and submit(i1 , q , a1 ). submit(i1 , q , a2 ).
accept(i1 , q , a1 ).accept(i1 , q , a2 ), where two answers to the same question are ac-
cepted from same candidate, are not accepted.
Answer Authentication can be further split into three different properties which al-
low us to precisely know whether, for a certain question, an unsubmitted answer is
accepted, no answer is accepted from a candidate that submitted an answer, or more
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∀i,∀q
1 2 3
submit(i , q , a) A:=ˆ{a}
submit(i , q , a) A:=A∪{a}
accept(i , q , a) [a∈A]
submit(i , q , a)
Fig. 3: QEA for Answer Authentication
than one answer is accepted from the same candidate. For instance, updating the QEA
depicted in Fig. 3 by getting rid of state (3), converting state (2) into an accepting state,
and adding a self loop transition on state (2) labeled by accept(i , q , a) [a∈A] results in
a QEA that fails only when an unsubmitted answer is accepted (see [7] for more details).
Question Ordering. The previous properties formalize the main requirements that are
usually needed concerning answer submission and acceptance. However, additional re-
quirements might be needed. For example, candidates may be required to answer ques-
tions in a certain order: a candidate should not get a question before validating his
answer to the previous question. This is ensured by Question Ordering.
Definition 4 (Question Ordering). Let q1 , . . . , qn be n questions such that the order
ord(qk ) of qk is k . Property Question Ordering is defined by the QEA depicted in Fig. 4
with alphabet ΣQO = {get(i , q), accept(i , q)}.
The QEA of Question Ordering fails if a candidate gets (or an answer is accepted from
him for) a higher order question before his answer to the current question is accepted.
Note, Question Ordering also allows only one accepted answer per question. Otherwise,
there is no meaning for the order as the candidate can re-submit answers latter when he
gets all the questions.
Exam availability. An e-exam must allow candidates to take the exam only during the
examination phase. Exam Availability states that questions are obtained, and answers
are submitted and accepted only during the examination time.
Definition 5 (Exam Availability). Let t0 be the starting instant, and tf be the ending
instant of the exam. Property Exam Availability is defined by the QEA depicted in Fig. 5
with alphabet ΣEA = {get(i , t), change(i , t), submit(i , t), accept(i , t)}.
∀i , Initially c : =ˆ1
1 2
get(i , q) [ord(q)<c]
get(i , q) [ord(q)=c]
get(i , q) [ord(q)≤c]
accept(i , q) [ord(q)=c]c++
Fig. 4: QEA for Question Ordering
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1 2
ΣEA(i , t)
[t0>t∨t>tf ]
F :=ˆ{i}
ΣEA(i , t)
[t0>t∨t>tf ]
F :=F∪{i}
Fig. 5: QEA for Exam Availability
∀i
1 2 3
begin(i , t) [t1≤t≤t2 ]tb :=ˆt
accept(i , t) [tb≤t≤t2∧t−tb≤dur(i)]
end(i)
Fig. 6: QEA for Exam Availability with Flexibility
The QEA of Exam Availability checks that all the events inΣEA are emitted between t0
and tf . It also collects all the candidates that violates the requirements in a set F . Note,
any other event can be added to ΣEA if required.
Exam availability with flexibility. Some exams offer flexibility to the candidates, so
that a candidate is free to choose the beginning time within a certain specified period. To
capture that, we define Exam Availability with Flexibility which states that no answer
can be accepted from a candidate before he begins the exam, after he terminates the
exam, after the end of his exam duration, or after the end of the specified period. The
beginning time of the exam may differ from one candidate to another, but in any case it
has to be within a certain specified period. The exam duration may also differ between
candidates. For example, an extended duration may be offered to certain candidates
with disabilities.
Definition 6 (Exam Availability With Flexibility). Let t1 and t2 respectively be the
starting and the ending time instants of the allowed period, and let dur(i) be the exam
duration for candidate i . Property Exam Availability with Flexibility is defined by the
QEA depicted in Fig. 6 with alphabet ΣEA = {begin(i , t), end(i), accept(i , t)}.
Exam Availability with Flexibility also requires that, for each candidate i , there is only
one event begin(i , t) per exam. Hence, it fails if event begin(i) is emitted more than
once. A candidate can begin his exam at any time tb such that t1 ≤ tb ≤ t2 . Note, no an-
swer can be accepted from a candidate after then ending time t2 of the period, if the du-
ration of the candidate is not finished yet. Assume that t1 = 0, t2 = 1, 000, dur(i1 ) =
90, and dur(i2 ) = 60. Then, trace begin(i1 , 0 ).accept(i1 , 24 ).begin(i2 , 26 ).accept
(i2 , 62 ).accept(i1 , 90 ) is accepted. While, trace accept(i1 , 5 ).begin (i1 , 20 ) and trace
begin(i1 , 0 ).accept(i1 , 91 ) are not accepted since in the first one an answer is accepted
from candidate i1 before he begins the exam, and in the second one an answer is ac-
cepted after the exam duration expires.
∀q, A : =ˆ∅
1 2
corrAns(q , a) A:=ˆA∪{a}
marked(q , a, b) [(b=1⇔a∈A)]
marked(q , a, b) [b=1⇔a∈A]
Fig. 7: QEA for Marking Correctness
Event submit is not included
in ΣEA, thus an answer submission
outside the exam time is not con-
sidered as an irregularity if the an-
swer is not accepted by the authority.
However, again other events (e.g.,
get and submit) can be considered.
In such a case, the QEA in Fig. 6 has
to be edited by looping over state (2) with any added event.
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∀i
1 2
34
marked(q , a, b)
accept(i , q , a) A:=ˆ{(q,a)}
accept(i , q , a) A:=A∪{(q,a)}
marked(q , a, b) [(q,a)/∈A]
marked(q , a, b) [(q,a)∈A]A:=A\{(q,a)}; s:=ˆb
marked(q , a, b) [(q,a)/∈A]
accept(i , q , a) A:=A∪{(q,a)}
marked(q , a, b) [(q,a)∈A]A:=A\{(q,a)}; s:=s+b
assign(i ,m) [m=s∧A=∅]
marked(q , a, b)
Fig. 8: QEA for Mark Integrity
Marking correctness. The last two properties state that each candidate should get the
correct mark, the one computed correctly from his answers. Marking Correctness states
that all answers are marked correctly. In the QEA of Marking Correctness, the correct
answers for the considered question are collected in a set A (self loop over state (1)).
Definition 7 (Marking Correctness). Property Marking Correctness is defined by the
QEA depicted in Fig. 7 with alphabet ΣMC = {corrAns(q , a),marked}(q , a, b)}.
In state (1), once an answer to the considered question is marked correctly, a transition
to state (3) is fired, otherwise if an answer is marked in a wrong way a transition to an
implicit failure state occurs. In state (3), the property fails either if an answer is marked
in a wrong way, or if an event corrAns(q , a) is encountered as this means that certain
answers are marked before all the correct answers are set.
Mark integrity. Property Mark Integrity states that all accepted answers are marked,
and that exactly one mark is assigned to each candidate, the one attributed to his an-
swers. Mark Integrity together with Marking Correctness, guarantee that each candi-
date participated in the exam gets the correct mark corresponding to his answers. The
QEA of Mark Integrity collects, for each candidate, the submitted answers in a set A.
Definition 8 (Mark Integrity). Property Mark Integrity is defined by the QEA depicted
in Fig. 8 with alphabet ΣMI = {accept(i , q , a),marked(q , a, b), assign(i ,m)}.
For each accepted answer, the QEA accumulates the corresponding score b in the sum
s . If the accepted answers are not marked, the property fails (failure state (2)). If the
candidate is not assigned a mark or assigned a wrong mark the property fails (failure
state (3)). Once the the correct mark is assigned to the candidate, if another mark is
assigned or any other answer is accepted from him, the property fails (square state (4)).
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4 Case Study: UJF E-exam
In June 2014, the pharmacy faculty at UJF organized a first e-exam, as a part of Epreuves
Classantes Nationales informatise´es project which aims to realize all medicine exams
electronically by 2016. The project is lead by UJF and the e-exam software is devel-
oped by the company THEIA12 specialized in e-formation platforms. This software is
currently used by 39 french universities. Since then, 1,047 e-exams have been organized
and 147,686 students have used the e-exam software.
We validate our framework by verifying two real e-exams passed with this sys-
tem. All the logs received from the e-exam organizer are anonymized; nevertheless we
were not authorized to disclose them. We use MarQ13 [6] (Monitoring At Runtime with
QEA) to model the QEAs and perform the verification. We provide a description for
this system that we call UJF e-exam14, then we present the results of our analysis.
4.1 Exam Description
Registration. The candidates have to register two weeks before the examination time.
Each candidate receives a username/password to authenticate at the examination.
Examination. The exam takes place in a supervised room. Each student handled a
previously-calibrated tablet to pass the exam. The internet access is controlled: only IP
addresses within an certain range are allowed to access the exam server. A candidate
starts by logging in using his username/password. Then, he chooses one of the available
exams by entering the exam code, which is provided at the examination time by the in-
vigilator supervising the room. Once the correct code is entered, the exam starts and
the first question is displayed. The pedagogical exam conditions mention that the can-
didates have to answer the questions in a fixed order and cannot get to the next question
before answering the current one. A candidate can change the answer as many times as
he wants before validating, but once he validates, then he cannot go back and change
any of the previously validated answers. Note, all candidates have to answer the same
questions in the same order. A question might be a one-choice question, multiple-choice
question, open short-text question, or script-concordance question.
Marking. After the end of the examination phase, the grading process starts. For each
question, all the answers provided by the candidates are collected. Then, each answer
is evaluated anonymously by an examiner to 0 if it is wrong, 0 < s < 1 if it is par-
tially correct, or 1 if it is correct. An example of a partially-correct answer is when a
candidate provides only one of the two correct answers for a multiple-choice question.
The professor specifies the correct answer(s) and the scores to attribute to correct and
partially-correct answers, as well, as the potential penalty. After evaluating all the pro-
vided answers for all questions, the total mark for each candidate is calculated as the
summation of all the scores attributed to his answers.
Notification. The marks are notified to the candidates. A candidate can consult his
submission, obtain the correct answer and his score for each question.
12 www.theia.fr 13 https://github.com/selig/qea 14 We have also designed an event-based
behavioral model of the e-exam phases that is not reported in this paper for space reasons. The
description was obtained and validated through discussions with the engineers at THEIA.
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4.2 Analysis
We analyzed two exams: Exam 1 involves 233 candidates and contains 42 questions
for a duration of 1h35. Exam 2 involves 90 candidates, contains 36 questions for a
duration of 5h20. The resulting traces for these exams are respectively of size 1.85 MB
and 215 KB and contain 40,875 and 4,641 events. The result of our analysis together
with the time required for MarQ to analyze the whole trace on a standard PC (AMD
A10-5745M–Quad-Core 2.1 GHz, 8 GB RAM), are summed up in Table 1. (X) means
satisfied, (×) means not satisfied, and [1] indicates the number of violations. Only four
of the eight general properties presented in Sec. 3 were compatible with UJF E-exam.
We considered five additional and specific properties for the UJF e-exam.
Property Candidate Registration was satisfied, that is, no unregistered candidate
submits an answer. Candidate Eligibility is also satisfied. We note that, in MarQ tool
the Candidate Eligibility monitor stops monitoring as soon as a transition to state (2)
is made since there is no path to success from state (2). Thus, only the first candidate
that violates the property is reported. In order to report all such candidates, we had
to add an artificial transition from state (2) to an accepting state that could never be
taken. Then, monitoring after reaching state (2) remains possible. Moreover, the current
implementation of MarQ does not support sets of tuples. Consequently, we could only
collect the identities i in a set F instead of the tuples (i , q , a).
Answer Authentication was violated only in Exam 1. We reported the violation to
the e-exam’s developers. The violation actually revealed a discrepancy between the
initial specification and the current features of the e-exam software: a candidate can
submit the same answer several times and this answer remains accepted. Consequently,
an event accept can appear twice but only with the same answer. To confirm that the
failure of Answer Authentication is only due to the acceptance of a same answer twice,
we updated property Answer Authentication and its QEA presented in Fig. 3 by stor-
ing the accepted answer in a variable av , and adding a self loop transition on state (3)
labeled by accept(i , q , a) [a=av ] . We refer to this new weaker property as Answer Au-
thentication ∗, which differs from Answer Authentication by allowing the acceptance
of the same answer again; but it still forbids the acceptance of a different answer. We
found out that Answer Authentication ∗ is satisfied, which confirms the claim about the
possibility of accepting the same answer twice. After diagnosing the source of failure,
we defined property Answer Authentication Reporting presented in Fig. 9, which fails
if more than one answer (identical or not) is accepted from the same candidate to the
same question. At the same time, it collects all such candidates in a set F . Answer Au-
thentication Reporting is defined by the QEA depicted in Fig. 9 with the input alphabet
ΣAAR = {accept(i , q , a)}. The analysis of Answer Authentication Reporting shows
that, for Exam 1, there is only one candidate such that more than one answer are ac-
cepted from him to the same question. The multiple answers that are accepted for the
same question are supposed to be equal since Answer Authentication ∗ is satisfied. Note
that MarQ currently does not support global variables, so for Answer Authentication
Reporting, a set is required for each question. Note for Exam 1, Answer Authentication
required less monitoring time than Answer Authentication ∗ and Answer Authentication
Reporting as the monitor for Answer Authentication stops monitoring as soon as it finds
a violation.
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Global:F : =ˆ∅ ∀q
1 2 3
accept(i , q , a) A:=ˆ{i}
accept(i , q , a) [i /∈A]A:=A∪{i}
accept(i , q , a) [i∈A]F :=ˆ{i}
accept(i , q , a) [i /∈A]A=A∪{i}
accept(i , q , a) [i∈A]F=F∪{i}
Fig. 9: QEA for Answer Authentication Reporting
Furthermore, UJF exam has a requirement stating that after acceptance the writ-
ing field is “blocked” and the candidate cannot change it anymore. Actually, in UJF
exam when a candidate writes a potential answer in the writing field the server stores
it directly, and once the candidate validates the question the last stored answer is ac-
cepted. As Answer Authentication shows, several answers can still be accepted after
the first acceptance, then the ability of changing the answer in the writing field could
result in an acceptance of a different answer. For this purpose, we defined property An-
swer Editing that states that a candidate cannot change the answer after acceptance.
Answer Editing is defined by the QEA depicted in Fig. 10 with the input alphabet
ΣAE = {change(i , q), accept(i , q , a)}.
∀i , ∀q
1 2
change(i , q)
accept(i , q , av )
accept(i , q , a) [a=av ]
Fig. 10: QEA for Answer Editing
Note, we allowed the acceptance
of the same answer to avoid the
bug found by Answer Authentica-
tion. Our analysis showed that An-
swer Editing was violated in Exam
2: at least one student was able to
change the content of the writing
field after having his answer accepted.
Concerning Question Ordering the developers did not log anything related to the
event get(i , q). However, we defined Question Ordering ∗ which fails if a candidate
changes the writing field of a future question before an answer for the current question
is accepted. Question Ordering ∗ is defined by the QEA depicted in Fig. 11 with the
input alphabet ΣQO′ = {change(i , q), accept(i , q)}. The idea is that if a candidate
changes the answer field of a question, he must have received the question previously.
Moreover, we allow submitting the same answer twice, and also changing the previous
accepted answers to avoid the two bugs previously found. Note, UJF exam requires the
candidate to validate the question even if he left it blank, thus we also allow acceptance
for the current question before changing its field (self loop above state (2)). The analysis
showed that Question Ordering ∗ was violated in both exams.
Alternatives to Answer Editing and Question Ordering can be defined to report all
the candidates who violate the requirement (see [7]). However, it cannot be imple-
mented using MarQ as it requires the ability either to manipulate the quantified variables
or to build sets of pairs which are both currently not supported by MarQ. However, the
tool still outputs the first candidate who violates the property.
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∀i
1 2 3
change(i , q) [ord(q)=1 ]
accept(i , q) [ord(q)=1 ]
c:=ˆ2
change(i , q) [ord(q)<c]
accept(i , q) [ord(q)<c]
accept(i , q) [ord(q)=c]
c++
change(i , q) [ord(q)=c]
change(i , q) [ord(q)≤c]
accept(i , q) [ord(q)<c]
accept(i , q) [ord(q)=c]
c++
Fig. 11: QEA for Question Ordering ∗
Note, the manual check of Question Ordering ∗ showed that some candidates were
able to skip certain questions (after writing an answer) without validating them, and
then validating the following questions.
As we found a violation for Question Ordering ∗, we defined Acceptance Order
that checks, for each candidate, whether all the accepted answers are accepted in order,
i.e., there should be no answer accepted for a question that is followed by an accepted
answer for a lower order question. Acceptance Order is defined by the QEA depicted
in Fig. 12 with the input alphabet ΣAO = {accept(i , q , a)}.
∀i , c : =ˆ11
accept(i , q) [ord(q)≥c]c:=ord(q)
Fig. 12: QEA for Acceptance Order
Exam Availability is also violated in Exam 2. A
candidate was able to change and submit an answer,
which is accepted, after the end of the exam duration.
We could not analyze Exam Availability with Flexi-
bility, since it is not supported by the exam. We also
did not consider Marking Correctness, and Mark In-
tegrity properties since the developers did not log
anything concerning the marking and the notification phase is done by each university
and we were not able to get the logs related to this phase. This shows that universities
only look for cheating candidates, and do not look for internal problems or insider at-
tacks. We expect the developers of the e-exam software to include logging features for
every phase. Note, we implemented all properties in MarQ and validated them on toy
traces as we expect to obtain the actual traces of the marking phase in the near future.
5 Related Work and Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address the runtime verification of
e-exams. However, a formal framework for checking verifiability properties of e-exams
based on abstract tests has been proposed by Dreier et al. in [8]. Note, the proposed
tests in [8] need to be instantiated for each exam depending on its specifications. The
authors of [8] have validated their framework by i) modeling two exams in the applied
pi-calculus [9], and then ii) analyzing them using ProVerif [10]. More precisely, they
proposed a set of individual and universal properties that allow to verify the correctness
of e-exams. The individual properties allow the candidate to check himself whether he
received the correct mark that corresponds to his answers. While the universal proper-
ties allow an outsider auditor to check whether only registered candidates participate in
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Table 1: Results of the off-line monitoring of two e-exams.
Exam 1 Exam 2
Property Result Time (ms) Result Time (ms)
Candidate Registration X 538 X 230
Candidate Eligibility X 517 X 214
Answer Authentication × 310 X 275
Answer Authentication ∗ X 742 X 223
Answer Authentication Reporting ×[1] 654 X 265
Answer Editing X 641 × 218
Question Ordering ∗ × 757 × 389
Acceptance Order X 697 X 294
Exam Availability X 518 ×[1] 237
the exam, all accepted answers are marked correctly, and all marks are assigned to the
corresponding candidates. The universal properties that we proposed revisit the prop-
erties defined in [8]. However, as mentioned before, this paper is concerned with the
monitoring of actual exam executions rather than operating on the abstract models of
the exam specification. Furthermore, in general, formal verification techniques such as
the one in [8] suffer from the so-called state explosion that may limit the size of systems
that can be verified. Moreover, as formal methods operate on models, they introduce an
additional question concerning the correctness of the abstraction. In contrast, as runtime
verification operates only on the actual event traces, it is less dependent on the size of
the system and, at the same time, does not require as much abstraction. Our properties
can be monitored only by observing the events of trace from an exam run.
System verification is also addressed in some other related domains e.g., in auc-
tions [11], and voting [12, 13]. Back to e-exams, Dreier et al. also propose a formal
framework, based on pi-calculus, to analyze other security properties such as authenti-
cation and privacy [14]. These complementary approaches study security and not veri-
fication, however both aspects are important to develop such sensitive systems.
All the mentioned related approaches only allow symbolic abstract analysis of the
protocols specifications, mainly looking for potential flaws in the used cryptographic
primitives. What is more, these approaches support neither on-line nor off-line analysis
of the actual logs obtained from system executions.
On the other hand, off-line runtime verification of user-provided specifications over
logs has been addressed in the context of several tools in the runtime verification com-
munity [15]: Breach for Signal Temporal Logic. RiTHM and StePr for (variants of)
Linear Temporal Logic, LogFire for rule-based systems, and Java-MOP for various
specification formalisms provided as plugins. MarQ [6] is a tool for monitoring Quan-
tified Event Automata [4, 5]. Our choice of using QEA stems from two reasons. First,
QEAs is one of the most expressive specification formalism to express monitors. The
second reason stems from our interviews of the engineers who were collaborating with
us and responsible for the development of the e-exam software at UJF. To validate our
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formalization of the protocol and the desired properties for e-exams, we presented the
existing alternative specification languages. QEAs turned out to be the specification lan-
guage that was most accepted and understood by the engineers. Moreover, MarQ came
top in the 1st international competition on Runtime Verification (2014)15 , showing that
MarQ is one of the most efficient existing monitoring tools for both off-line and on-line
monitoring. Note, off-line runtime verification was successfully applied to other case
studies, e.g., for monitoring financial transactions with LARVA [16], and monitoring IT
logs with MonPoly [17].
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We define an event-based model for e-exams, and formalize several essential properties
as Quantified Event Automata, enriched with global variables and pre-initialization. Our
model handles e-exams that offer flexible independent beginning time and/or different
exam duration for the candidates. We validate the properties by analyzing real logs from
e-exams at UJF. We perform off-line verification of certain exam runs using the MarQ
tool. We find several discrepancies between the specification and the implementation.
Analyzing logs of real e-exams requires only a few seconds on a regular computer.
Due to the lack of logs about the marking and notification phases, we were not able
to analyze all properties. The UJF E-exam case study clearly demonstrates that the
developers do not think to log these two phases where there is less interaction with the
candidates. However, we believe that monitoring the marking phase is essential since a
successful attempt from a bribed examiner or a cheating student can be very effective.
Several avenues for future work are opened by this paper. First, we intend to analyze
more existing e-exams: from other universities and the marking phase of the pharmacy
exams at UJF. We encourage universities and educational institutions to incorporate
logging features in their e-exam software. Moreover, we plan to perform on-line veri-
fication during live e-exams, and to study to what extent runtime enforcement (cf [18]
for an overview) can be applied during a live e-exam run. Finally, we plan to study
more expressive and quantitative properties that can detect possible collusion between
students through similar answer patterns.
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